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1. Introduction. 
J. L. Austin’s main discussion of knowledge is in “Other Minds”. (Austin 
1946; 1979.) The essay gives rise to numerous questions, both local and 
global. Ostensibly, the topic of the essay is knowledge of other minds. 
However, explicit discussion of that topic is postponed until its twenty 
seventh page. Apparently by way of preamble, the main body of the 
essay comprises an analysis of aspects of our ordinary treatment of 
expressions of knowledge, stippled with tantalizing pronouncements 
about knowing in general. One aim of my discussion is to address a 
global question about the function of Austin’s more general discussion 
of knowledge. How, if at all, does it further pursuit of our knowledge of 
other minds? More local questions arise about Austin’s 
pronouncements. 
I’ll also address a more local question. Austin invites us to consider 
a natural way of treating a claim to the effect that a goldfinch is present: 
 
If you have asked ‘How do you know it’s a goldfinch?’ then I may 
reply ‘From its behaviour’, ‘By its markings’, or, in more detail, ‘By 
its red head’, ‘From its eating thistles’.... You may object:... But 
that’s not enough: plenty of other birds have red heads. (Austin 
1946: 154–5; 1979: 83)  
 
Reflecting on the extent to which one who knows is required to be in a 
position to address such challenges, he writes the following: 
 
(b) Enough is enough: it doesn’t mean everything. Enough means 
enough to show that (within reason, and for presents intents and 
purposes) it ‘can’t’ be anything else, there is no room for an 
alternative, competing, description of it. It does not mean, e.g., 
enough to show it isn’t a stuffed goldfinch. (Austin 1946: 156; 1979: 
84) 
 
Austin’s pronouncement is both enticing and elusive: enticing, in that it 
seems to expose a significant limit on our obligations as knowers; 
elusive, in that Austin fails to resolve or vindicate the alleged limit. 
What does he mean to claim about knowing? Should we believe him? 																																																								
1 I’m grateful for discussion and comments to audiences at Oxford, Porto, and 
Warwick, and to Bill Child, Thomas Crowther, Naomi Eilan, Elizabeth 
Fricker, Anil Gomes, Mark Kalderon, Hemdat Lerman, Ian Phillips, Johannes 
Roessler, Matthew Soteriou, and Charles Travis. 
	 2 
Philosophical positions rarely form in a vacuum, and so one way to 
enhance one’s understanding of a position is by attending to its roots. 
On the topic of knowledge, Austin’s avant-couriers were his teacher, H. 
A. Prichard, and Prichard’s teacher, John Cook Wilson, and so it is on 
their work that I shall focus. (Important influences who won’t be 
considered here include G. E. Moore, especially his 1905–6.) I’ll begin by 
sketching the shared core of Cook Wilson’s and Prichard’s views about 
knowledge—the epistemological component of Oxford Realism—before 
pointing to ways in which Austin’s position emerges naturally from 
theirs. I’ll suggest that Austin would have viewed his discussion of 
knowledge, not only as a preamble to a treatment of knowledge of other 
minds, but as a case study. And I’ll suggest that Austin’s pronouncement 
is best understood as a partial characterization of a necessary, but 
insufficient, condition on knowing. We’ll see that when Austin’s 
pronouncement is so understood, there is no reason to take him to be 
proposing that someone might know that a goldfinch is present without 
being in a position to know that it isn’t stuffed. 
Section 2. comprises a sketch of six core commitments of Oxford 
Realism. Section 3. explains how Austin’s general discussion of 
knowledge constitutes a case study of our knowledge of other minds. 
Sections 4. and 5. develop an interpretation of Austin’s project on which 
his pronouncement leaves intact that being in a position to know is 
closed under known entailment. 
 
 
2. Oxford Realism. 
2.1. Knowledge as primitive. 
The first and most basic commitment of Oxford Realism is that 
knowledge is primitive. Thus, Cook Wilson writes: 
 
Perhaps most fallacies in the theory of knowledge are reduced to 
the primary one of trying to explain the nature of knowing or 
apprehending. We cannot construct knowing—the act of 
apprehending—out of any elements. I remember quite early in my 
philosophic reflection having an instinctive aversion to the very 
expression ‘theory of knowledge’. (Cook Wilson 1926: 803) 
 
Prichard echoes: 
 
Knowledge is sui generis and therefore a ‘theory’ of it is impossible. 
Knowledge is simply knowledge, and any attempt to state it in 
terms of something else must end in describing something which is 
not knowledge. (Prichard 1909: 245) 
 
According to Cook Wilson and Prichard, knowledge is a distinct kind, 
and cannot be constructed out of elements distinct from knowledge. If 
the goal of a theory of knowledge is to say how knowledge is 
constructed, then the goal is unachievable; there can be no such theory. 
 
2.2. Knowledge as akin to proof. 
The first commitment of Oxford Realism is bound up with a second: 
knowing amounts to, or is equivalent to, possession of proof: 
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In knowing, we can have nothing to do with the so-called ‘greater 
strength’ of the evidence on which the opinion is grounded; simply 
because we know that this ‘greater strength’ of evidence of A’s 
being B is compatible with A’s not being B at all. (Cook Wilson 
1926: 100) 
 
The view is not that one who knows must possess a cogent derivation of 
what they know from premises that are distinct—and, perhaps, known. 
That is, the view is not that knowing is equivalent to possession of a 
proof. Rather, the view is that knowing is itself proof of what is known 
Where one knows, one has a conclusive guarantee of that which one 
knows. One’s standing with respect to that which one knows is 
incompatible with falsity. Thus, meeting a threshold condition on 
strength of evidence could not suffice for knowing if meeting that 
condition were consistent with falsity. 
As Prichard notes, Cook Wilson appears to have derived his model 
of knowing from reflection on mathematics: 
 
The point of departure of Cook Wilson's views lay in his 
unwavering conviction of the truth of mathematics. In 
mathematics we have, without real possibility of question, an 
instance of knowledge; we are certain, we know. (Prichard 1919: 
302) 
 
The model of mathematics is useful in presenting a case in which it is 
plausible that we can possess absolute guarantees of truth. Furthermore, 
it presents a case in which we can possess such guarantees both with 
respect to basic and derived truths, and so a case in which the 
distinction between possession of proof and possession of a proof is 
operative. However, the model also points to a delicate issue about the 
notion of incompatibility that figures in Cook Wilson’s exposition. For 
suppose that incompatibility of a standing with falsity amounted to the 
impossibility of having that standing with respect to a proposition whilst 
the proposition is false. On the natural assumption that true 
mathematical propositions are necessarily true, it would be impossible 
to have any standing with respect to such propositions whilst those 
propositions were false. And in that case, incompatibility with falsity 
would fail to characterize a distinctive property of the standing of one 
who knows. Thus, the operative notion of incompatibility must be more 
demanding than the simple modal notion. 
 
2.3. Knowledge as a state of mind. 
The third commitment of Oxford Realism is a partial corollary of the 
first two: knowing is a state (or frame, or condition) of mind. We can 
reconstruct a path to the commitment as follows. If one’s standing when 
one knows is to furnish one with a guarantee against falsity, then it must 
make a difference to one’s subjectivity. Thus, one’s standing must partly 
comprise a mental state. Suppose, then, that that mental state did not 
suffice for knowing. In that case, knowing would comprise that mental 
state together with whatever extra-mental elements provide a guarantee 
against falsity. But in that case, knowing would be constructible out of 
elements. Hence, since knowing is at least partly mental, and is not 
constructible out of elements, it must be wholly mental. That is, 
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knowing is a mental state, occupancy of which state is incompatible 
with falsity. (See also McDowell 1982; Williamson 2000.) 
 
2.4. Knowing as distinct from believing. 
Connected with the third commitment is a fourth: knowing is not a 
form of believing. In particular, knowing is not believing whilst meeting 
further conditions. In fact, Cook Wilson makes the stronger claim that 
knowing excludes believing: 
 
Belief is not knowledge and the man who knows does not believe 
at all what he knows; he knows it. (Cook Wilson 1926: 100) 
 
Prichard brings together the previous four commitments in a way which 
again echoes Cook Wilson: 
 
Knowing is not something which differs from being convinced by 
a difference of degree of something such as a feeling of confidence, 
as being more convinced differs from being less convinced, or as a 
fast movement differs from a slow movement. Knowing and 
believing differ in kind as do desiring and feeling, or as do a red 
colour and a blue colour. (Prichard 1950: 87) 
 
Both Cook Wilson and Prichard are drawn to the stronger claim that 
knowing excludes believing due to their positive views about the 
distinctive nature of believing—in particular, that believing is a matter 
of holding something true on broadly evidential grounds whilst 
recognizing that one’s grounds fail to decide the issue. By contrast, some 
contemporary thinkers will be willing to adopt a more minimal 
conception of believing, or to accept the existence of a more general 
kind of state of mind that encompasses believing. For example, they will 
be willing to allow a conception on which believing, or some more 
general sort of state of mind, is a matter of holding something true in a 
way that is potentially responsive to evidence. However, the crucial 
claim here is that knowing isn’t itself a form of believing. And one could 
consistently endorse that claim whilst allowing that knowing doesn’t 
exclude believing, or even that knowing entails believing. I can see no 
grounds for thinking that Cook Wilson or Prichard would have denied 
that knowing was, or at least entailed occupancy of, a frame of mind of 
the more general sort. (See Williamson 2000: 41–48.) 
 
2.5. The Accretion. 
The fifth commitment of Oxford Realism concerns our capacities to 
know which frames of mind we occupy. The seemingly implausible 
strength of this commitment, together with its seeming independence 
from other commitments, has led Charles Travis to label it the Accretion. 
(Travis 2005.) Cook Wilson presents the commitment in the following 
passage: 
 
[knowledge cannot be one of] two states of mind…the correct and 
the erroneous one…quite indistinguishable to the man himself. 
[For] as the man does not know in the erroneous state of mind, 
neither can he know in the other state (Cook Wilson 1926: 107) 
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The first thought contained here is that subjects must be in a position 
to distinguish any state of knowledge from other “erroneous” states of 
mind, at least in principle. The second is that if a state were not in the 
required sense distinguishable by its subject from “erroneous” states, 
then—since those other states are, by assumption, not states of 
knowledge—that state could not be a state of knowledge.  
Cook Wilson’s view may have been sponsored by an argument like 
the following. In order for a state to be a case of knowledge it must be 
different in kind from any “erroneous” state. Furthermore—and, 
perhaps, because the kinds in question are mental kinds—the required 
difference must have a subjective reflection: it must make a difference 
to how things are, or seem, from the subject’s perspective. If the 
difference between the target state and its “erroneous” ringers were 
blankly external to the way things are for the subject, then how things 
were subjectively for the subject of either kind of state would be 
compatible with their not knowing. And in that case, even if they 
occupied the target state, they wouldn’t know. A final step in the 
argument is required in order to connect the requirement that the 
difference between knowing and its “erroneous” ringers be reflected 
subjectively with the further requirement that the subject be in a 
position to distinguish the two states—that is, to tell the two states 
apart. 
What, more precisely, does Cook Wilson mean by claiming that 
subjects must be in a position to distinguish states of knowing from 
ringers? Prichard offers the following elaboration: 
 
We must recognize that when we know something we either do, 
or by reflecting can, know that our condition is one of knowing 
that thing, while when we believe something, we either do or can 
know that our condition is one of believing and not of knowing: so 
that we cannot mistake belief for knowledge or vice versa. 
(Prichard 1950: 88) 
 
Prichard’s elaboration of the Accretion invokes two conditions on 
knowing: 
 
(i) If one knows p, then one is in a position, at least in principle, 
to know by reflection that one knows p.  
(ii) If one believes p without knowing p, then one is in a position, 
at least in principle, to know by reflection that one believes p 
without knowing p. 
 
Condition (i) does not obviously entail condition (ii). It is consistent to 
hold that one might fail to know p whilst being unable to know by 
reflection that one failed to know p even if one also held that if one 
knew p, then one would be in a position to know that one knew p. To 
take one sort of example, one might reasonably hold that a severely 
drunk person can fail to know that they are drunk (and can even believe 
that they are sober) whilst at the same time being precluded by their 
drunkenness from knowing that they don’t know that they are drunk. 
And holding that would seem perfectly consistent with also holding that 
someone who is sober, and who knows that they are, would be in a 
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position to know that they know that. (See Williams 1978: 309–313; 
Soteriou 2016: 117–156.) 
Furthermore, when conditions (i) and (ii) are distinguished, it 
becomes apparent that meeting the former condition would be enough 
to render states of knowing distinguishable from their ringers. On at 
least one reasonable understanding, one can distinguish Fs from Gs just 
in case one can activate knowledge that presented Fs are not Gs. 
Similarly, one can distinguish Gs from Fs just in case one can activate 
knowledge that presented Gs are not Fs. Thus, distinguishability is 
asymmetrical. Very often the required capacities run in step: one can 
activate knowledge that a presented sheep isn’t a wolf when, and only 
when, one can activate knowledge that a presented wolf isn’t a sheep. In 
those cases, the asymmetry doesn’t matter. But in the sorts of cases 
we’ve just considered, the capacities can come apart: one can activate 
knowledge that a case of one’s sobriety isn’t a case of one’s severe 
drunkenness, even though one cannot activate knowledge that a case of 
one’s severe drunkenness isn’t a case of one’s sobriety. One can 
distinguish one’s knowing from one’s occupying ringer states if one can 
activate knowledge that one’s state is not a ringer state. And that can be 
so even if one cannot distinguish one’s occupying a ringer state from 
one’s knowing. Cook Wilson’s requirement that knowing be 
distinguishable by its subjects from ignorance can be implemented by 
condition (i); condition (ii) is needless. 
Even if we treat the Accretion as incorporating only condition (i), 
it seems implausibly demanding. For according to condition (i), that one 
knows is, in Timothy Williamson’s sense, a luminous condition: for every 
case a, if in a one knows, then in a one is in a position to know that one 
knows. And Williamson has offered powerful arguments that no 
condition which obtains only sometimes—and in particular no such 
condition that one knows—is luminous. (Williamson 2000: 93–123) 
 
2.6. Being under the impression. 
The Accretion presents Oxford Realism with a difficulty. Given the 
luminosity of one’s epistemic position, how is it possible for one to 
make mistakes? More carefully, how is it possible for one to make 
mistakes that one cannot, by reflection, correct? Cook Wilson offers 
the following example: 
 
…we see at a little distance a person whom ‘we mistake for an 
acquaintance’ and without hesitation perform some act which it 
would be a liberty to take with anyone but an acquaintance, do 
something in fact which we rightly say we should not have done if 
we had ever suspected he was not an acquaintance. We did not act 
on an opinion that it was our friend; for, in forming an opinion, we 
are aware that the evidence is insufficient and, if we had thought 
that, we should never have done the act. It seems more like belief; 
but if we had consciously made it a matter of belief, we should 
have distinguished it from knowledge, and then again, ex hypothesi, 
we should not have done the act. Probably one answer offered 
would be that, though we didn’t know, we thought we knew. But 
this will not suffice. Apart from the criticism we have already 
passed on this phrase itself, if we really thought we knew, we must 
have reflected and must have thought the evidence conclusive, 
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whereas, ex hypothesi, any reflection shows it could not be 
conclusive. (Cook Wilson 1926: 109–10) 
 
Cook Wilson fails to detail what no Edwardian would have risked from 
a position of ignorance. His response to the challenge of explaining its 
performance is the invocation of a further species of attitude: being 
under the impression. This is the sixth commitment of Oxford Realism. 
Being under the impression is—like opinion or belief—a mode of 
holding something to be true. However, unlike belief or opinion, being 
under the impression need not be installed or sustained by reflection. 
Indeed, being under the impression is incompatible with, and so apt to 
be destroyed by, reflection. (Cook Wilson 1926: 108–113) 
Being under the impression falls outside the scope of the 
Accretion. One cannot know by reflection that one is under an 
impression, since reflection would release one from its hold. Thus, being 
under the impression can help to explain how subjects can hold things 
to be true in a way precluded by the activation of knowledge. It can 
explain how unreflective mistakes are possible. However, it’s natural to 
think that some mistakes can withstand reflection. If one were 
ensconced in a standard skeptical scenario, then one might be subject to 
mistakes both about how things were—e.g. that one had hands—and 
about one’s attitudes to how things were—e.g. that one knew that one 
had hands. And it’s natural to think that no amount of reflection would 
remedy one’s situation. 
There are two broad routes via which an attempt might be made 
to exploit the state of being under the impression in order to explain 
reflective error. The first would be to deny that genuinely reflective 
errors are possible. Genuine reflection would reveal that one doesn’t 
know that one has hands and, so, that one isn’t entitled to hold true that 
one has hands. The claim would be that we are commonly less reflective 
than we take ourselves to be—that is, than we are under the impression 
of being. The second route would be to extend the first by seeking to 
explain barriers to reflection. The claim would be that in certain 
circumstances genuine reflection cannot be undertaken. Severe 
drunkenness might block reflection. More delicately, being the subject 
of a skeptical scenario might prevent the activation of knowledge that 
would otherwise enable reflection. 
That completes my sketch of the six core commitments of Oxford 
Realism: (1) knowledge is primitive; (2) knowledge is akin to proof; (3) 
knowledge is a state of mind; (4) knowledge is distinct from belief; (5) 
the Accretion; (6) mistakes depend upon the unreflective state of being 
under the impression. (See also Marion 2000a, 2000b; Travis 2005; 
Travis and Kalderon 2013.) 
 
 
3. Other Minds. 
There are numerous echoes of Oxford Realism in Austin’s work. Cook 
Wilson and Prichard both present commitment (1), knowledge as 
primitive, as precluding one form of theory of knowledge. Austin agrees: 
 
…there could be no general answer to the questions what is evidence 
for what, what is certain, what is doubtful, what needs or does not 
need evidence, can or can’t be verified. If the Theory of 
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Knowledge consists in finding grounds for such an answer, there is 
no such thing. (Austin 1962: 124) 
 
Commitment (2), knowledge as akin to proof, reverberates more widely. 
Thus, for example, Austin contrasts (inconclusive) evidence with what 
settles a question: 
 
The situation in which I would properly be said to have evidence 
for the statement that some animal is a pig is that, for example, in 
which the beast itself is not actually on view, but I can see plenty 
of pig-like marks on the ground outside its retreat. If I find a few 
buckets of pig-food, that’s a bit more evidence, and the noises and 
the smell may provide better evidence still. But if the animal then 
emerges and stands there plainly in view, there is no longer any 
question of collecting evidence; its coming into view doesn’t 
provide me with more evidence that it’s a pig, I can now just see that 
it is, the question is settled. (Austin 1962: 115; cp. 1946: 176–182; 
1979: 105–111) 
 
Austin makes a closely related point here: 
 
…saying ‘I know’ is taking a new plunge. But it is not saying ‘I have 
performed a specially striking feat of cognition, superior, in the 
same scale as believing and being sure, even to being merely quite 
sure’: for there is nothing in that scale superior to being quite sure. 
(Austin 1946: 171; 1979: 99) 
 
It is natural to read Austin as appealing here to a distinction between 
the accumulation of grounds for sureness of belief and the achievement 
of a position that differs not merely in degree, but in kind. 
The distinction between evidence and proof feeds into the idea of 
knowledge as a state of mind distinct from belief (commitments (3) and 
(4)). At first blush, Austin might be read as rejecting the first idea in the 
following passage: 
 
If we like to say that ‘I believe’, and likewise ‘I am sure’ and ‘I am 
certain’, are descriptions of subjective mental or cognitive states or 
attitudes, or what not, then ‘I know’ is not that, or at least not 
merely that: it functions differently in talking. (Austin 1946: 150; 
1979: 78–9) 
 
However, the key phrase is “or at least not merely that” and the main 
point is to distinguish knowing from believing. The claim is that ‘I 
know’ is not merely a description of a subjective mental state. That is 
either because knowing differs from believing in not being merely a 
subjective mental state, or because ‘I know’ has functions over and 
above describing the subjective mental state of knowing. (The latter idea 
figures in Austin’s infamous comparison of ‘I know’ with ‘I promise’. See 
Austin 1946: 169–175; 1979: 97–103.) 
There is evidence, then, if not proof, that Austin accepted at least 
the first four commitments of Oxford Realism. That supports a 
straightforward answer to our first question. A general discussion of 
knowledge might be useful preparation for a discussion of knowledge of 
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other minds. However, insofar as Austin views knowledge itself as a 
state of mind, such a discussion assumes a more central role. For the 
question how we can know about what other people know is viewed as a 
special case of the more general question of how we can know about 
other’s minds. 
Furthermore, there are forces internal to Oxford Realism that 
make it pressing to address questions about our knowledge of what 
other people know. One source of pressure is the idea that knowledge is 
primitive. It is apt to seem to follow from that idea that there are no 
independently specifiable criteria by which to discern whether or not 
someone knows. And in that case, we can’t account for our knowledge 
of whether or not someone knows by appeal to our knowledge of 
whether or not they satisfy such criteria. A second source of pressure 
arises from the Oxford Realist treatment of the idea that knowing is a 
state of mind and, in particular, the Accretion. For by making the 
reflective subject decisively authoritative about whether or not they 
know, the Accretion problematizes the idea that other people might 
have access to ways of determining whether or not the subject knows 
other than via recourse to the subject’s avowals of their own reflective 
view about whether or not they know. The first two sources of pressure 
sponsor a third: the threat of dogmatism. Suppose, first, that reflective 
subjects can be decisively authoritative about whether or not they know 
and, second, that there are no independently discernible conditions to 
which appeal can be made in attempting to show that subjects are wrong 
to take themselves to know. In that case, it would be hard to see how a 
challenge could be mounted to someone’s sincere and reflective claim to 
know. The situation would be akin to one in which a subject reflectively 
avows that they believe something. Typically, the most that one would 
achieve by challenging such an avowal would be to encourage the subject 
to reflect again. So questions about how we can know whether other 
people know arise naturally from engagement with Oxford Realism. (R. 
G. Collingwood’s central complaint about Oxford Realism was that it 
enabled dogmatism. (Collingwood 1939.) The threat was live: Cook 
Wilson thought he knew that non-Euclidean geometry is impossible. 
Cook Wilson 1926: 456, 561. See also Prichard 1950: 99–100.) 
As Austin in effect observes, the Oxford Realist denial that 
knowing can be reconstructed out of other materials—that is, their 
claim that there are no independently specifiable sufficient conditions for 
knowing—leaves open that there are independently specifiable necessary 
conditions on knowing. One such condition to which the Oxford 
Realists make explicit appeal is that if one knows, then one can’t be 
wrong. (See e.g. Cook Wilson 1926: 69; Prichard 1950: 88.) Opining 
falsely is incompatible with knowing. It is to that condition that Austin 
points in his comment to the effect that talk about knowing functions 
differently from talk about believing. Whilst falsity is no immediate 
threat to the claim that someone believes, it excludes the claim that 
they know. So, if it is belief’s compatibility with falsity which is 
supposed to ground the idea that belief is merely subjective, and which 
in turn grounds the idea that thinkers are decisively authoritative about 
what they believe, then that ground is unavailable with respect to 
knowing. 
Austin’s central project involves seeking to discern further 
necessary conditions on knowing, as revealed in our ordinary handling of 
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challenges to a thinker’s claims to know. A typical challenge might begin 
with the question how the thinker knows, raised with the aim of having 
the thinker reveal sources of their standing, with those revelations 
potentially giving rise to further challenges. Thus, for example,  
 
If you have asked ‘How do you know it’s a goldfinch?’ then I may 
reply ‘From its behaviour’, ‘By its markings’, or, in more detail, ‘By 
its red head’, ‘From its eating thistles’. (Austin 1946: 154; 1979: 83)  
 
Austin focuses on challenges to the presumption that the thinker 
possesses a standing equivalent to proof: 
 
You may object:... But that’s not enough: plenty of other birds 
have red heads. (Austin 1946: 155; 1979: 93)  
 
If the thinker’s standing were exhausted by their awareness of the bird’s 
red head, then—according to the challenger—their standing would be 
compatible with falsehood, and so could not amount to proof. 
Superficial appearances notwithstanding, we can see Austin as 
pursuing questions about our knowledge of other minds throughout 
“Other Minds”. In doing so, he seeks to discern necessary conditions on 
knowing. In the following section, we’ll consider some of the conditions 
that he discerns. 
 
 
4. Reasons for Doubt. 
The question at issue is whether some particular thinker knows some 
particular fact. The answer is pursued by a challenger who seeks to 
determine whether the claimant meets necessary conditions on 
possessing proof: 
 
It is in the case of [this] objection that you would be more inclined 
to say right out ‘Then you don’t know’. Because it doesn’t prove it, 
it’s not enough to prove it. (Austin 1946: 155; 1979: 84) 
 
One natural reading is the following. It is a necessary condition on 
knowing that a goldfinch is present that one’s standing is equivalent to 
proof. It is a natural consequence of that condition that one who knew 
would be in a position to articulate that standing, so as to show that 
they had the required standing. And showing that one had the required 
standing would amount to providing proof. If the best that a thinker 
could do by way of articulating their standing didn’t amount to proof, 
then their incapacity would provide reason to think that they lacked 
proof and, so, failed to know. 
On the natural reading, it would be reasonable to expect that if a 
candidate knower were able successfully to navigate all appropriate 
challenges to their claim to know, then their doing so would constitute a 
conclusive defence of their claim. That is a perspective from which it is 
natural to read Austin’s further comments on the obligations attending 
the candidate: 
  
(a) If you say ‘That’s not enough’, then you must have in mind 
some more or less definite lack. ‘To be a goldfinch, besides having 
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a red head it must also have the characteristic eye-markings’: or 
‘How do you know it isn’t a woodpecker? Woodpeckers have red 
heads too’. If there is no definite lack, which you are at least 
prepared to specify on being pressed, then it’s silly (outrageous) 
just to go on saying ‘That’s not enough’. 
(b) Enough is enough: it doesn’t mean everything. Enough means 
enough to show that (within reason, and for presents intents and 
purposes) it ‘can’t’ be anything else, there is no room for an 
alternative, competing, description of it. It does not mean, e.g., 
enough to show it isn’t a stuffed goldfinch. (Austin 1946: 156; 1979: 
84) 
 
My focus in this section will be (a). (We’ll return to (b) in the next 
section.) The central thought in (a) seems to be that there can be reason 
to doubt that a candidate knows something only if there is a reason for 
doubting that the candidate’s standing amounts to proof that is available 
to the challenger—that is, a reason that is specifiable, and so known. On 
the face of it, this represents a significant restriction on the candidate’s 
obligations. They are required to be in a position to respond to a 
challenge only if that challenge isn’t silly (outrageous); and a challenge 
meets that condition only if it is backed by reasons that are specific and 
available. Austin expands on the apparent restriction: 
 
The doubt or question ‘But is it a real one?’ has always (must have) a 
special basis, there must be some ‘reason for suggesting’ that it 
isn’t real, in the sense of some specific way, or limited number of 
ways, in which it is suggested that this experience or item may be 
phoney. (Austin 1946: 159) 
 
According to the natural reading, where no challenge that is 
appropriately grounded in available reasons is forthcoming, the 
candidate knows. 
By way of comparison, consider a similar idea expressed by J. M. 
Hinton: 
 
…the apparent rigorism which runs ‘I need more than there is 
here, before I stop saying that an item is not known’ is at the same 
time the apparent laxism, ‘I need no more than there is here, to 
make me admit an item “not p” as epistemically possible—not 
known not to be the case’. (Hinton 1989: 232) 
 
Believing that something is known and believing that something is not 
known should be treated symmetrically. Insofar as one should believe 
something only if one has reasons for believing it, one should believe 
that something is known only if one has reasons for believing that it is 
known. But for the same reason, one should believe that something is 
not known only if one has reasons for believing that it is not known. 
Thus, one should believe that a candidate does not know that a 
goldfinch is present—that from their perspective it is epistemically 
possible that it’s not the case that a goldfinch is present—only if one has 
reasons for believing it. Doubt and belief are equally reason hungry. 
Hinton’s proposal that belief and doubt be treated symmetrically 
doesn’t impose any substantive restriction on the obligations attending 
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candidate knowers. In particular, it doesn’t insulate their claims to know 
from defeat by countermanding reasons on grounds of the unavailability 
of those reasons. To what extent does Austin’s proposal impose such a 
restriction? We can pursue that question by considering a development 
of Austin’s proposal due to Adam Leite: 
 
If one recognizes that there is no reason in favour of some 
possibility that would undermine one’s authority, competence, or 
reliability regarding a certain domain, then (other things being 
equal) one may reasonably believe things in that domain even if 
one lacks adequate independent grounds for believing that the 
possibility does not obtain, and one may reasonably dismiss as 
groundless the suggestion that it does obtain. (Leite 2011: 94) 
 
If one recognizes (and so knows) that there are no reasons for believing 
that not-p is epistemically possible, then there are no reasons for 
believing that not-p is epistemically possible; and in that case, one may 
reasonably believe p. Although Leite doesn’t present his proposal as 
covering the case of knowledge, a natural extension would be the 
following. If one recognizes that there is no reason in favour of any 
possibility the obtaining of which would undermine a claim to know, 
then one is in a position to dismiss as groundless any objections to that 
claim, and so to endorse the claim. Indeed, that would be a way of 
possessing proof. 
Leite’s proposal seems close to Hinton’s plea for symmetry and, to 
that extent, not to impose substantive restrictions on candidate 
knowers’ obligations. However, Leite’s applications of the proposal 
reveal that, as he understands it, it differs from Hinton’s. 
Leite seeks to apply his proposal in order to undercut forms of 
skepticism that are based on an alleged inability to know that one isn’t 
dreaming. Leite considers two types of case that might be thought to 
sponsor a threat to knowledge based on one’s current experience. The 
first type of case is that of a dream that is phenomenologically 
indistinguishable from wakeful experience. Here, the threat to 
knowledge is supposed to arise because one lacks positive reasons for 
believing that one isn’t currently suffering such a dream. If it were an 
epistemic possibility that one is currently suffering such a dream, then it 
is plausible that its being so would preclude one from exploiting one’s 
current experience in order to know things about one’s environment. 
Hence, the fact that one has—and as a matter of principle can have—no 
positive reasons for excluding that epistemic possibility seems to 
undercut one’s claim to know. However, the nature of such a dream not 
only rules out one’s acquiring positive reasons for thinking that one is 
not suffering one. It also rules out one’s acquiring reasons for thinking 
that one is suffering one. Thus, on reflection, one can recognize that one 
can never be apprised of reasons for believing that one is now suffering 
such a dream. And now, according to Leite, his proposal operates to 
deliver the result that the putative epistemic possibility can reasonably 
be dismissed as groundless. (Leite 2011) Thus, in serving to exclude what 
might otherwise have seemed a threatening possibility, Leite’s proposal 
is shown to impose a substantive restriction on the obligations of 
knowers.  
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Given the substantive restriction on the obligations of knowers, 
admissible challenges to claims to know must be grounded on facts or 
reasons that are themselves available, and so knowable. Thus, the only 
type of dream the possibility of which could pose a threat to one’s claim 
to know would be a dream which was phenomenologically 
distinguishable from one’s actual experience, and that is the second sort 
of case that Leite considers. In this case, he allows that we have some 
reasons for believing that we might now be suffering such a dream since 
we have, after all, suffered such dreams in the past. However, we can in 
principle establish that we are not suffering such a dream, by exploiting 
their phenomenological distinguishability from wakeful experience. We 
therefore have the resources to exclude the possibility. 
Unlike Leite’s initial proposal, his applications rely on restricting 
admissible challenges to those grounded on available reasons. That 
suggests that the transition from proposal to applications involved 
slippage. On closer inspection, that is what we find.  
This can be seen by comparing the following principles: 
 
1. If one recognizes that there are no reasons that support a 
possibility, then the possibility may be dismissed. 
2. If one doesn’t recognize that there are reasons that support a 
possibility, then the possibility may be dismissed. 
3. If one recognizes that one can’t recognize that there are 
reasons that support a possibility, then the possibility may be 
dismissed. 
 
Leite’s initial proposal is a version of principle 1. However, his 
applications rely not on one’s recognizing that there are no reasons that 
support a possibility, but rather on one’s recognizing that one cannot 
recognize that there are such reasons. Thus, Leite’s applications rely on 
a version of principle 3., rather than 1. We can most clearly see the 
difference between those principles by reflecting on the difference 
between principles 1. and 2. 1., as we observed above, relies on one’s 
recognizing, and so knowing, that there are no reasons that support a 
possibility. Since knowing is factive, that principle delivers that there are 
no such reasons. By contrast, principle 2. relies only on one’s failure to 
recognize any reasons that support a possibility. That would entail that 
there are no such reasons only on the assumption that we are 
incorrigible with respect to the geography of reasons. Having noted the 
weakness of principle 2., by contrast with 1., it becomes obvious that 
principle 3. represents no significant advance. For again, one’s 
recognizing that one is debarred from recognizing reasons in support of 
a possibility leaves open that that is due to limitations on our ability to 
track whatever reasons there are, rather than to the absence of such 
reasons. Thus, principle 1. is quite plausible, but is of no assistance in 
dealing with, for example, phenomenologically indistinguishable dreams. 
In order to exploit that principle, one would have to recognize, and so 
know, that there are no reasons for believing that one is suffering such a 
dream. By contrast, principle 3. might sustain the dismissal of the 
possibility that one is suffering such a dream, but only at a cost to 
plausibility. For meeting its condition is consistent with getting things 
wrong, for reasons of which one is unaware even in principle. (That is 
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the central message of Barry Stroud’s use of Thompson Clarke’s example 
of the plane spotters. Stroud 1984: 67–74; Clarke 1972.) 
The upshot is that principles 2. and 3. impose no plausible 
restriction on the obligations of knowers, since one can adhere to the 
restriction and yet fail to know. And principle 1., whilst plausible, 
imposes no substantive restriction. With that information in hand, let’s 
return to consideration of Austin’s proposal. Is it a version of the 
insubstantial principle 1., or is it rather a version of the substantial but 
implausible principle 3.? 
It is neither. It can’t be the second because the gap between a 
thinker’s being unaware, even in principle, of reasons that would 
undermine their claim to know and, on the other hand, there being no 
such reasons, is too large and too obvious to have escaped Austin’s 
attention. And it can’t be the first because Austin builds into his 
proposal that operative reasons must be available. But if Austin’s 
proposal isn’t to be understood in either of those ways, how is it to be 
understood? 
At the outset, I suggested that Austin’s proposal seems to impose 
a substantive restriction on the range of challenges that a knower should 
be in a position to address. And I suggested that his proposal seems to 
allow that someone able to answer all such challenges would thereby 
count as knowing. If we adhere to both of those suggestions, we are 
forced to read Austin as proposing a restriction on what knowers should 
be in a position to do that is either insubstantial or implausible. Since 
Austin explicitly endorses the first suggestion, we should reject the 
second: it is no part of Austin’s proposal that being able to deal with all 
available reasons for doubt is a sufficient condition on knowing. 
John McDowell provides a useful model for the proposed reading 
of Austin. McDowell presents a view of the standing, and obligations, of 
knowers comprising three main claims. First, knowing p is a matter of 
possessing reasons that suffice for truth. (Compare Oxford Realism (2) 
and (3).) However, second, one can meet that condition without 
knowing specifiable, non-question-begging reasons that suffice for that 
truth. (Compare Oxford Realism (1).) For example, one’s possession of 
reasons for holding p might be constituted by one’s seeing p or one’s 
remembering p, where those standings could not be specifiable 
independently of appeal to one’s knowing p. Appeal to those standings 
would therefore beg the question against a challenge to one’s claim to 
know. One might possess reasons that don’t beg the question in that 
way—for example, facts about the way things look to one. But there is 
no general expectation that it will be possible to reconstruct sufficient 
conditions for truth on the basis of those reasons. What is the role of 
those reasons, if not to constitute one’s standing as a knower? 
McDowell’s third claim addresses that question. Knowing requires that 
one is doxastically responsible. That is, it requires that one is appropriately 
sensitive to non-question-begging reasons for or against the truth of 
what one knows. (McDowell 1994.) As I’ll explain, that necessary 
condition on knowing is central to the proposed reading of Austin.  
McDowell presents his model in the following passage: 
 
There is a completely cogent argument from the fact that 
someone, say, sees that things are thus and so to the conclusion 
that things are thus and so. But that argumentative transition 
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cannot serve to explain how it is that the person’s standing with 
respect to the fact that things are thus and so is epistemically 
satisfactory…. Genuinely mediated epistemic standings, on the 
conception I have in mind [—that is, the governing conception 
that McDowell rejects—], would have to consist in the cogency of 
an argument whose premises do not beg the relevant question of 
epistemic standing “If one’s takings of things to be thus and so are 
to be cases of knowledge, they must be sensitive to the 
requirements of doxastic responsibility. We could not conceive 
remembering that things are thus and so, say, as a standing in the 
space of reasons if a subject could count as being in that position 
even if he were not responsive to the rational force of 
independently available considerations—the material to which the 
governing conception appeals. But we can separate that point from 
the idea that one can reconstruct the epistemic satisfactoriness of 
the standing in terms of the rational force of those considerations. 
(McDowell 1994: 416) 
 
Austin endorses the proposed distribution of epistemological labor. In 
accord with Oxford Realism, he views knowing as possession of 
conclusive reasons. However, in order to have access to such reasons, 
one must be appropriately sensitive to independently specifiable, non-
question-begging reasons. Crucially, that obligation is limited. Although 
one must be able to address appropriate challenges to one’s claim to 
know, such challenges must be based upon reasons that are both specific 
and available. As we saw, the limitations that Austin proposes are 
implausible if taken to exhaust the obligations on knowers. However, 
when construed as limitations on the demands of doxastic responsibility, 
where the latter is a necessary but not sufficient condition on knowing, 
they appear defensible. 
In the next section, the proposed reading of Austin is extended in 
order to encompass part (b) of the target passage. As we’ll see, this 
allows for a reading of that passage which is less dramatic, but more 
plausible, than an alternative reading due to Mark Kaplan (2011). 
 
 
5. Enough is Enough. 
In the previous section, I suggested that we read Austin as aiming to 
characterize only a necessary condition on knowing, according to which 
knowing requires appropriate sensitivity to non-question-begging 
reasons for or against what one claims to know. The conditions on 
doxastic responsibility are weaker than the conditions on knowing, since 
knowing requires possession of conclusive reasons and, so, reasons that, 
in effect, beg the question against challenges. In this section, the 
proposed reading is applied to Austin’s claim, in (b), that enough is 
enough: that meeting the obligations that attend knowing that there is a 
goldfinch requires being in a position to do enough to show that “there 
is no room for an alternative, competing, description of it. It does not 
mean, e.g., enough to show it isn’t a stuffed goldfinch.” (Austin 1946: 156; 
1979: 84) 
One might read the passage as suggesting that the description of 
something as stuffed needn’t compete with its description as a 
goldfinch, because it’s possible for something to be both. (Austin was 
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skeptical about the idea that claims about ordinary things carry a 
determinate range of entailments: 1946: 159–161; 1979: 88–89; 1962: 118–
124.) Another way of reading (b) would be as allowing that one might be 
in a position to show that something is a goldfinch without (yet) being 
in a position to show that it isn’t stuffed because one hadn’t realized 
that being a goldfinch entails not being stuffed. Kaplan proposes a more 
tantalizing reading of the passage. On Kaplan’s reading, Austin’s 
proposal is that one might be in a position to meet sufficient conditions 
on knowing that something is a goldfinch, and also that its being a 
goldfinch entails that it isn’t stuffed, and yet not be in a position to 
know that it isn’t stuffed. (Kaplan 2011) 
Kaplan’s reading can be developed via the sixth component of 
Oxford Realism, the appeal to a state of being under the impression. On 
this reading, knowing that there is a goldfinch, and that its being a 
goldfinch entails that it isn’t stuffed, would impose an obligation to hold 
true that it isn’t stuffed. However, one can meet that condition without 
knowing that it isn’t stuffed. For one might hold it true unreflectively in 
being under the impression that it isn’t stuffed. (Kaplan 2011: 60–72)  
On the assumption that Austin follows the Oxford Realists in 
identifying knowledge with possession of proof, Kaplan’s reading would 
have Austin allowing that one can have proof that there’s a goldfinch, 
and that that entails that it isn’t stuffed, without being able to convert 
those proofs into proof that it isn’t stuffed. But if one’s purported 
proofs leave it open whether it’s stuffed, then one might reasonably 
doubt that what one has are proofs. It’s imaginable that one might have 
done enough to show that something is a goldfinch, and that its being so 
entails that it isn’t stuffed, without having done anything further to 
show that it isn’t stuffed. But one might wonder why Austin would have 
accepted the demand that showing that something isn’t a stuffed 
goldfinch must proceed independently of showing that it is a goldfinch. 
Furthermore, and as noted by Leite, Kaplan’s reading is in tension 
with Austin’s explicit animadversions about assumptions: 
 
To say…that we are making assumptions and taking things for 
granted whenever we make an ordinary assertion, is of course to 
make ordinary assertions look somehow chancy.... (Austin 1962: 
138; Leite 2011: 91, fn.24) 
 
Austin’s general target is the idea that one isn’t always in a position to 
know all the things that are entailed by things that one takes oneself to 
know. In that case, Austin suggests, ordinary claims to know would look 
somehow chancy, since those claims would be dependent on things 
about which one was strictly ignorant. One’s standing with respect to 
the things that one claims to know would appear no better than one’s 
standing with respect to the mere assumptions on which those claims to 
know depend. Austin’s response casts doubt on the conjunctive claim (i) 
that there are things entailed by things that one takes oneself to know 
and (ii) that one is confined to assuming those things. Since Kaplan’s 
reading relies upon Austin’s endorsing that conjunction, the reading is 
undermined. 
We’ve seen, in the previous section, that an alternative 
interpretation of Austin’s project is available. According to the 
alternative, Austin’s discussion of what a knower must be in a position 
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to show is concerned not with the totality of a knower’s reasons, but 
only with those that sponsor their doxastic responsibility. Knowing 
requires being appropriately sensitive to non-question-begging reasons 
for or against what one claims to know. In this case, it requires being 
appropriately sensitive to non-question-begging reasons for or against 
the claim that there is a goldfinch. However, one’s non-question-begging 
reasons needn’t furnish proof that there’s a goldfinch. So, although a 
proof that there is a goldfinch would be convertible, inter alia, into a 
proof that it isn’t stuffed, the reasons that figure in that proof are liable 
to beg the questions whether it’s a goldfinch and, thus, whether it’s 
stuffed. Alternatively, one’s non-question-begging reasons for holding 
that there is a goldfinch can leave open whether it’s a goldfinch—for 
example, by leaving open whether it’s stuffed. Thus, we can find passage 
(b) intelligible without reading Austin as allowing that someone could 
know that there is a goldfinch, and that that entails that it isn’t stuffed, 
whilst being incapable of knowing that it isn’t stuffed. 
 
 
6. Conclusion. 
I’ve suggested that that we can better understand some otherwise 
puzzling aspects of “Other Minds” if we read that work against the 
background of Oxford Realism. First, we can discern evidence that 
Austin agreed with the Oxford Realists in viewing knowing as a mental 
state. In that way, we can see the whole of Austin’s essay as addressing 
its titular topic. Second, we can discern evidence that Austin agreed 
with the Oxford Realists in viewing knowing as primitive. In that way, 
we can see him as seeking to uncover necessary conditions on 
knowing—including, especially, the requirement of doxastic 
responsibility—without treating those conditions as elements in a 
conjunctive reconstruction of knowing. And that, in turn, makes space 
for a plausible reading of some of Austin’s tantalizing pronouncements.  
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